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ABSTRACT 
 
 Does our perception of corruption affect our interactions? This question was answered 
through an experimental survey of 90 participants and the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
from Transparency International’s 2017 Report.  The survey revealed that those who were 
categorized as low-corrupt with an above average CPI exhibited altruism towards individuals 
from perceived high-corrupt regions but discriminated negatively against them when restrictions 
were placed on the interaction. In the experiment, participants were allowed to give any amount 
between zero and six dollars in both games. Altruism was measured through the dictator game 
and low-corrupt participants were found to give one dollar more, $3.60, to those perceived to be 
high-corrupt than they gave to participants who were perceived to be low-corrupt, $2.60. The 
ultimatum game was the measure for a restricted environment and low-corrupt participants gave 
sixty cents less, $2.80, to those perceived to be high-corrupt than they gave to participants 
perceived to be low-corrupt, $3.40. Other findings from the survey exhibited discriminatory 
behavior by categorized high-corrupt participants but were ultimately not statistically significant.  
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Section I – Introduction 
 
Discrimination and corruption both benefit few while causing harm to many. For the 
purposes of this research, discrimination is formally defined as a preconceived opinion that is not 
based on reason or actual experience (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). Corruption, in accordance with 
much of the research on the topic, is formally defined as the abuse of public power for private 
benefit (Tanzi, 1998). Both of these negatively affect society in different ways and their study is 
important to comprehend their relationship on an individual’s behavior. 
Discrimination affects the way individuals interact with each other on a daily basis. 
Implicit biases generate automatic judgments and shape either negative or positive perceptions of 
the people around them. Studies have shown that people default to favor the in-group over the 
out group (Greenwald and Krieger, 2006). Although the decision to favor the in-group may not 
occur at all times, this natural inclination leads to segregation on several lines. One tool often 
used in research to measure these inclinations is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). One study 
linked the IAT with discriminatory behavior and found that white students who reported to have 
undesirable attitudes towards black students had negative interactions which then led to more 
prejudice (McConnell and Leibold, 2001). 
The practice of discrimination also has detrimental effects on minorities who experience 
it on a daily basis. It is unfair to those being discriminated against as it creates an uneven playing 
field where people are unable to achieve their maximum potential. One study indicates that 
experience of continuous discrimination, even if benign, leads to a poorer adjustment of 
immigrant Latino/as in the United States (Huynh et. al, 2012). Another study found that black 
participants, exhibited an evaluative preference for white partners in a difficult task that only 
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increased the more that they accepted social inequalities existed (Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles and 
Monteith, 2003). In these cases, discrimination leads to decreased morale amongst those that are 
being discriminated against and can be damaging to the advancement of historically oppressed 
communities. One study corroborated this thought by finding that one important factor for why 
African Americans do worse in the labor market is due to their names (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2004). When something as simple as a name puts one person at a disadvantage 
over another, it emphasizes the importance of studying discrimination. 
Corruption on the other hand has slowed the economic development of several countries 
across the world and as a result has put large groups of people at a disadvantage. Some argue that 
corruption is actually good for a society as it leads to efficiency that works against bad policy 
and creates a system where the best entrepreneurs are the ones that are able to bribe the 
bureaucrats for favors (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968). The argument follows that those who are 
able to give the largest bribe are inherently more efficient and therefore more deserving of the 
benefits that corruption brings. While the argument sounds convincing, there is a volume of 
research that disproves efficient corruption theories. One study finds that those who are able to 
win the bidding wars with the highest bribes are not necessarily the most efficient (Tanzi, 1998). 
Other studies point to corruption as the cause of slower economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 
2001). While corruption seems favorable in the short run, it has detrimental effects to 
governments and their citizens.  
The problems of discrimination and corruption indicates that there is harm caused to 
people by both topics. These effects range from a decrease in morale, an inability to succeed, and 
stunted economic growth. One question, which has yet to be answered directly, is whether or not 
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there is a relationship between discrimination and perception of corruption separate from race 
and country of origin. In other words, does the perception of corruption affect individual 
interactions? This paper aims to explore the issue through an empirical survey and ultimately 
answer this question. This question serves as an extension to much of the work on discrimination 
and corruption and works to combine the two fields through an interesting perspective. Also, the 
study of the perception of corruption and discrimination is more important than ever before in a 
hostile global political climate undergoing a wave of nationalism (Eger and Valdez, 2015). In 
this context, politicians from across the world have been are more discriminatory towards outside 
groups.  
The paper aims to empirically measure interactions through strategic games and provide a 
quantifiable measure of discrimination against perceived high-corrupt and low-corrupt 
individuals. Through these findings, an important question can be answered that can then lay the 
foundation for research that questions why discrimination on the perception of corruption occurs.  
The paper is comprised of eight sections including the introduction (Section I). Section II 
is a summary of the literature reviewed that provides a clear picture of the research surrounding 
the topic of interest. Section III contains the research questions as well as the hypotheses. Section 
IV explains the methodology for the survey and its justification. Section V presents the data of 
the survey, argues for its validity, and analyzes the results that will be used to test the 
hypotheses. Section VI discusses the results and its implications as well as limitations of the 
survey. Section VII has a general conclusion, the other remaining parts not divided into sections 
are the references and appendix. 
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Section II – Literature Review 
 This section contains five subsections, the first four subsections are a thorough and 
relevant review of the literature of four areas: corruption, discrimination, experimental games, 
and similar work to the questions posed in this paper. The final subsection summarizes the 
literature reviewed and offers justification for the topic in question and its uniqueness by further 
explaining the current gap in the research.  
 
Subsection I – Corruption 
 Corruption is an ambiguous concept and much of the research surrounding the topic has 
only been developed since the 1960s.  While the study of corruption has only been a recent 
development, the practice of corruption can be found throughout history dating back from the 
times of the old testament to the ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle 
(Dimant and Schulte, 2016). As mentioned earlier, there are several theories that point to 
corruption as a force for good that improves economic efficiency (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968). 
These theories, one of the first in the field of study, rely on a level playing field where all players 
have an equal chance to succeed and bribe and are only differentiated by their abilities to 
prosper. Commonly known as “greasing the wheels,” these theories indicate that the attention of 
bureaucrats can be best determined by the number of bribes they receive and will as a result only 
focus on the work that is most important. This logic has been rebuked by several scholars as they 
have proven that corruption tends to decrease economic growth. (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). 
While the negative effects it has on society have been proven empirically, the nature of 
corruption research is dynamic and diverse.  
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 Bicchieri and Ganegonda’s 2016 chapter explores what drives individuals to engage in 
corrupt behavior. Viewing corruption as a socio-psychological problem, they utilize the theory of 
planned behavior and theory of social norms to evaluate the social and cognitive mechanism that 
lead to corrupt behavior. Through their research they find that a mix of social, institutional, and 
psychological factors factor influence an individual to act corruptly (Bicchieri and Ganegonda, 
2016). The conclusions of this research emphasizes that the reasoning as to why people act 
corruptly is not a simple concept to understand and that a multilayered approach is necessary to 
enact productive policy to help curb corruption.  
 Fisman and Miguel’s 2007 paper uses data from diplomatic parking in Manhattan and 
correlates the frequency of violations to the level of corruption by country. In an environment 
where diplomats had the ability to park wherever they pleased due to immunity, actions were 
solely governed by cultural norms. The paper found that the number of parking violations by 
diplomats is strongly correlated with their countries measure of corruption (Fisman and Miguel, 
2007). When enforcement was enacted through New York City’s change of law that did not 
allow diplomats to invoke immunity, violations dropped dramatically by 98 percent. This 
research indicates that a culture of corruption affects the way that people act in outside 
environments, actor’s willingness to follow the law is dependent from the culture they come 
from. 
 Hauk and Seaz-Marti’s 2002 paper explored the cultural transmission of corruption and 
the effects that it has on generations. The research finds evidence that corruption is partly due to 
cultural elements and a generally corrupt environment often times serves as a justification for 
ones’ own behavior (Hauk and Seaz-Marti, 2002). This indicates that corruption can never be 
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completely solved due to the influence of culture, but it also does demonstrate that corruption is 
influenced by generations. While the prospect of the inability to completely dissolve corruption 
may be disheartening, it also emphasizes the importance of educating youth to drive future 
generational change. This also has important implications for how the children of first generation 
immigrants interact in a non-corrupt country and how their behavior evolves as they grow older 
while being raised in a culture of corruption. 
Shleifer and Vishny’s 1993 paper explores why corruption affects economic development 
through the actions of government agents. These two reasons are due to a weakness of central 
government and the practice’s demand for secrecy. In the paper, the authors assume the 
principal-agent problem to be true, meaning that they agree that the government actor has control 
over a desired good. Taking this as a given, they study the consequences of the actor’s resource 
allocation. The study’s model finds that a weak central government contains too many individual 
agencies to bribe and puts a burden on the investor that drives them away to a country where one 
only has to pay one or no bribe (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The difficulty of navigating the 
system for foreign people makes it too costly for them to seek investment, which results in less 
investment overall in the country as a whole. The study also finds that the secrecy of corruption 
pulls investment to less productive areas like construction while moving money away from areas 
that are beneficial to society but demand transparency, like health and education (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993). Research supporting this finding has found that corruption is never good for 
economic growth while also discovering that costs of corruption under regulation decrease but 
are never positive (Johnson et al., 2014). As is clear, corruption is harmful to a country as it 
deprives its citizens of access to vital services and pushes those resources towards less corrupt 
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countries, developing them further and increasing inequality throughout the world.  
Several studies emphasize the importance of studying corruption as an interdisciplinary 
topic (Dimant and Schulte, 2016; Jain, 2001). Jain’s 2001 paper stresses the need for future 
research and points to a focus on empirical observation centered on a general equilibrium 
framework (Jain 2001). Dimant and Schulte’s 2016 paper introduces an interdisciplinary 
approach that combines different theories together to produce a three-tiered structural framework 
(internal, meso and external) for understanding corruption (Dimant and Schulte, 2016). The 
internal world encompasses two theories, rational choice theory and the behavioral perspective, 
that explain why individuals choose to engage in corrupt actions. Research suggests that internal 
factors alone are not enough to purely explain corrupt behavior and therefore one must consider 
the social environment to fully understand why individuals decide to engage (Dimant and 
Schulte, 2016). The meso world focuses on the social theories that create an environment in 
which individuals can act corruptly. The external world refers to outside factors such as laws and 
institutions that create ample opportunity for corrupt social settings to develop. In short, the 
reasons for why individuals decide to engage in corrupt activities are not solely due to individual 
decision making and are a mix of social and institutional rules that encourage certain actions.  
Dimant and Tosato’s 2017 survey paper describes various effects and causes of 
corruption that have been discovered through research. A condensed and comprehensive version 
of the research listed several effects for the causes of corruption which include a wide range of 
factors ranging from poverty to religion to governmental structure (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). A 
clear message to take away from this survey is that there are a series of factors that may cause 
corrupt societies to develop. In addition to the many effects, the causes of corruption are also 
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diverse and have been met with conflicting results (Dimant and Tosato, 2017). The survey paper 
concludes that conflicting findings with earlier and more recent work are a result of the 
increasingly empirical nature of the field that is now moving away from subjective inferences. 
(Dimant and Tosato, 2017). The paper’s conclusions give an optimal view that the future of 
corruption research will lead to more robust results in light of a growing empirical foundation.  
 In sum, research on corruption is diverse and has developed significantly since the 1960s. 
Furthermore, it has long been established that corrupt practices negatively affect development in 
already underdeveloped countries and push resources to rich governments, exacerbating 
inequality. Whether influenced by familial education or a general culture of corruption, research 
is growing increasingly empirical with a focus on multilayered approaches that give a better 
understanding as to why individuals choose to engage in corrupt practices. One message that is 
clear is that corruption’s effects and causes are complicated and a nuanced relationship between 
it and discrimination requires further study.  
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Subsection II – Discrimination 
 The study of discrimination has roots in the implicit bias that all individuals carry and it 
is a topic that has been researched extensively with specificity to race and gender. Everyone at 
some point in their life has experienced some sort of discrimination. If gone unchecked, it can 
lead to inequality against the victims while depriving the perpetrators of meaningful interactions.  
 Richards and Lucas’ 1985 paper explores the topic of discrimination and the effects of 
how institutional discrimination warps common understanding of what one considers to be 
discriminatory behavior. Through a macro view of discrimination that takes into account how 
rules organize the basic organization of communities, one can better understand how individuals 
come to discriminate in favor of some groups over others. Though the paper’s approach is not 
based on empirical research, its case-study on why women can’t drive buses demonstrates how 
some discriminatory policy is created with incorrect inferences and ultimately makes the 
institution accountable, not the individual whose logic has been flawed by unfair rules (Richards 
and Lucas, 1985). Another finding from the paper also suggests that discriminatory individual 
actions are actually based on inherently biased rules. These findings are important as it offers a 
differing perspective on discriminatory behavior and creates a foundation for one to evaluate 
individual actions in a larger context. 
 Lang and Lehmann’s 2012 paper provides a comprehensive survey of the research 
surrounding labor relations and discrimination against blacks. While there is no existing theory 
that is capable of assessing difference in wage and employment, the literature surrounding the 
topic has a solid foundation through which a theory can be created (Lang and Lehmann, 2012). 
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In light of the lack of a unifying theory, it is important to focus efforts on historically segregated 
communities because that is where differences are first created. When discussing how people 
interact and develop their judgements it is clear that most judgements are developed early on and 
are difficult to change later in life. While discrimination against blacks may not be solvable even 
if a unifying theory existed, the research provides an important lens into future of research on 
racial discrimination.  
 Research by Charles and Guryan aims to address the disadvantage in labor market 
outcomes that has persisted despite the removal of exclusionary policies over fifty years ago. 
Research finds that the opportunity to study discrimination empirically is at times not possible 
due to the subjectivity of observational data. Despite this, there is a growing volume of work 
analyzing unfair practices in the labor market empirically and discrimination theoretically 
(Charles and Guryan, 2011). While there may be an inability to be able to fully study the effects 
of inequitable practices in the labor market, a meta-analysis discovers that racial discrimination 
against Blacks and Latinos in hiring has not changed in the past twenty-five years (Quillian et al., 
2017). These outcomes contradict the notion that discrimination has been declining in American 
society and further proves that no real progress has been made in labor market hiring practices. 
While the current state of academic research on labor market discrimination and the lack of 
change in hiring practices is disheartening, there is a general optimism for future creative work 
on the topic. Academic research on discrimination, while difficult, is important because it lays 
the groundwork to help find solutions to a problem that has seen little change historically. 
 Two main forms of discrimination are taste-based and statistical discrimination. Taste-
based discrimination occurs when people consciously discriminate based on prior beliefs of the 
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victim’s group membership. Research has found that taste-based discrimination often leads to 
statistical discrimination where a manager may have an added standard of beauty for women that 
is not present for men which then creates an environment where men perform better than women 
(Neilson and Ying, 2016). Statistical discrimination can then be justified under this artificially 
created environment. Aside from these two, there has been a growing body of research that 
references implicit discrimination, where the individual is not consciously aware of their actions. 
Research finds that this type of discrimination is malleable but persistent across all type of 
decision making (Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan, 2005). Solutions to this problem come at a 
low cost and can produce an environment where discriminatory behavior is mitigated through 
simple actions. 
` Bohren, Imas, and Rosenberg’s 2017 paper explores the nuance in gender discrimination 
through an analyses of an online forum where individuals interact in a strictly academic setting. 
The research ultimately found that women with a “low” reputation where discriminated against 
by users. A reversal occurred and men than began to be discriminated against once a certain 
threshold of reputation points were received for women (Bohren, Imas and Rosenberg, 2017). 
These findings imply that discrimination is dynamic and changes based on reputation as people 
overestimate the competency of groups that have been historically discriminated but have 
achieved success regardless. This research is supported by a field experiment that concludes that 
male graduate students are more likely to receive the attention faculty members than female 
graduate students (Milkman, Akinola and Chugh, 2012). Female graduate students at this point 
have not achieved the adequate reputation to experience increased attention that warrant the 
increased attention found in other research.  
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 In sum, the study of discrimination ranges from environments that encourage 
discriminatory practices to nuances in how genders are evaluated. While there may be a 
difficulty in empirically studying discrimination in the labor market against race, analysis can 
help provide solutions to a field that has seen little change in decades. Additionally, simple 
solutions to implicit discrimination can help even the playing field so that some genders are not 
unfairly discriminated earlier in their career. A link between corruption and discrimination 
provides an important insight to the field as it adds another layer to the understanding of people’s 
actions. 
Subsection III – Experimental Games 
 An accurate means to empirically measure discrimination is through the use of 
experimental decision games. Games like these create an environment where individuals are 
given a choice and are required to take attention. Different games are used to elicit and measure 
the extent of different emotions. This sections provides an overview of the research surrounding 
the games used in the survey.  
 The dictator game is a setting in which the actor is given a sum of money and decides 
how much money to keep for themselves. There are no consequences for the actor because their 
decision is final. This game is essentially a measure of altruism because people are put in an 
environment where their actions are dependent on their own beliefs and nothing else.  
Fowler’s 2006 paper explores altruism and the effects that it has on voting patterns 
through the use of the dictator game. The findings from the research on altruism are diverse but 
suggests that individuals in the dictator game frequently bear costs to make others better off 
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(Fowler, 2006). As the dictator game is an accurate measure for how people value the welfare of 
others, the researchers make the link that a subject’s altruism correlates with their likelihood of 
turning out to vote. This paper is an important example of the use of the dictator game as an 
empirical measure of a subject’s altruistic behavior and sets a precedent for future research 
involving the game.  
Lesorog and Ensminger’s 2014 paper also uses the dictator game as a measure of fairness 
and altruism to better understand cross-cultural variation between Africa and the United States. 
The researchers use the double blind and regular dictator game to test for differences in the 
effects of giving, the double blind dictator offers increased anonymity to the players to further 
measure their altruistic tendencies. The study finds that the results did not change significantly in 
the Kenyan sites while there was a major drop in the United States (Lesorog and Ensminger, 
2014). The reason for these differences may be a result of cultural views of anonymity and while 
there was a drop in the United States, it was not a drastic shift from the actions of their Kenyan 
counterparts.  
Whitt and Wilson’s 2007 paper explore the tension between ethnic groups in post-war 
Bosnia through measuring fairness and giving in the dictator game. In their experiment, 
participants are paired with an anonymous but ethnically identifiable player. Researchers find 
that despite a bloody civil war, norms of reciprocity can emerge again and a norm of fairness, 
measured through giving, persists across ethnicities (Whitt and Wilson, 2007). The implications 
from this research are important as they point to the possibility of a social order following a 
major conflict that discriminated against different ethnicities. Additionally, the study’s use of the 
dictator game as a measure of fairness adds to a growing body of research that find the method as 
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a valid way of receiving empirical data.   
Schurter and Wilson’s 2009 paper investigates the nuances between justice and fairness 
and utilizes the dictator game to deepen understanding in the differences between the two 
concepts. While it is found that approximately seventy percent of dictators give around twenty-
five to the other player, the terms of justice and fairness are used interchangeably (Forsythe et 
al., 1994). Through a series of treatments, research shows that justice is what legitimizes 
property rights in the dictator game as participants do not respond to fairness in significant ways 
(Schurter and Wilson, 2009).  Understanding these nuances are important as they expand one’s 
grasp of the benefits and drawbacks that the dictator game has to offer. Other research finds a 
significant difference when presenting the terms of the game as taking rather than giving, 
signifying that the norms of an institution play a large factor in determining outcomes (List, 
2007). 
Another games used in the survey is the ultimatum game. In this setting, there is a shared 
pool of money and participants are either givers or receivers. The giver decides how much to 
keep for themselves and how much to give to the other person. The receiver can decide to either 
accept or reject the offer, if they accept then both get what the giver decided but if they reject 
than neither party receives anything.  
Gaula’s 2008 paper on the ultimatum game points to its versatility to measure differences 
in culture and habits among participants. The paper emphasizes that the ultimatum game can 
only be used a measurement tool if proper standardization has been achieved (Gaula, 2008). The 
tool has been used to measure generosity and cooperation in many different types of society’s 
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across the world. One field experiment in Tanzania found that a low amount of sharing occurs 
when people are unable to be sanctioned for their actions (Marlowe, 2004). Another study done 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon forest points to in-group differences between indigenous people as 
the reason for why individuals from a less stable political structure share less on average (Patton, 
2004). Ultimately, while the ultimatum game is not a perfect measure for measuring fairness and 
trust among others, it does provide a platform for such experiments to take place.  
All in all, the ultimatum and dictator games offer an opportunity to empirically study 
discrimination as it presents users with an environment where a decision must be made that relies 
only on assumptions made by the participant. The dictator game, with a setup that allows the 
subject to make a decision with no repercussions, offers an accurate measure for the altruism 
towards different populations. The ultimatum game adds an additional caveat to the environment 
where individuals must make a decision with fear of rejection. This makes the interaction more 
complicated as it forces decision makers to actively think about the background of the person 
they are interacting with and evaluate how fair they perceive the interaction to be. This is 
especially difficult when the two partners in the game come from different cultural backgrounds.  
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Subsection IV – Similar Work 
 While the topic of corruption-based discrimination is niche, there is some existing 
literature in the field that deals with the perception of immigrants. One paper in particular that 
does hold some similarity to the topic of this thesis is Barr and Serra’s 2010 experimental 
analysis on corruption and culture. In their two-part study, their findings from 2005 led them to 
be able to predict who would act corruptly with reference to the level of corruption in their home 
country among undergraduate students but not graduate students (Barr and Serra, 2010). While 
there may be various reasons for why this takes place, some of it can be explained as a result of 
selection pool and length of time in the country. These experiments were replicated in 2007 and 
the same outcome occurred, they could predict corrupt behavior among undergraduates but not 
graduate students. This study reveals that the propensity to engage in corruption comes in part 
from the culture that one was raised in. While there is some evidence for this, the inability to 
predict corrupt behavior in graduate students and the decrease in corrupt actions that come from 
an extended stay in the United Kingdom ultimately argue that it is not fair to judge immigrants 
solely on the basis of their home country (Barr and Serra, 2010).   
Subsection V – The Gap in Research 
 
 While the literature reviewed is extensive, discrimination on the basis of corruption has 
not been directly studied by any of the work that has been assessed. The area of corruption has 
undergone tremendous change in the past 60 years. While the notion that corruption negatively 
affects economic development has been confirmed, the field is growing increasingly more 
empirical with a larger focus on objective results. The best way study corruption is through a 
22 
 
multilayered approach coming from an interdisciplinary perspective.  Research on discrimination 
has long focused on unfair hiring practices in the labor market with a specific focus on its effects 
on race and gender. The field has been historically difficult to analyze empirically, but research 
on racial discrimination can better influence policy decisions to an issue that has seen no change 
in the past 25 years. Additionally, research on gender finds discrimination early one in one’s 
career with an overcompensation once someone has achieved success. Lastly, experimental 
games have been used as an empirical measure of altruism and fairness by a large volume work 
as it creates an ideal environment where a participant makes a decision with limited information. 
Experimental games allow researchers to isolate variables where one is able to measure under 
specific outcomes.  
 As can be seen, there is a gap in the research when combining the fields of corruption and 
discrimination. The field of corruption has long studied its causes and effects while emphasizing 
its complex nature but has yet to directly investigate the effects of the perception of corruption. 
The field of discrimination has extensively researched the effects of prejudiced behavior on race 
and gender but has yet to directly link how an individual’s perception of corruption affects the 
way they interact with others. Also, the topic of this paper is similar in design to the work of Barr 
and Serra’s 2010 research, it does not aim to predict if individuals will engage in corrupt 
behavior. The purposes of this study are to establish if discrimination solely on the basis of 
corruption exists. While the work is also done in a university setting, the goals of the research are 
different.  
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Section III – Research Questions & Hypotheses 
 
Following a thorough review of the literature, a further inquiry into the relationship 
between the perception of corruption and discrimination would be beneficial to the existing 
literature as it examines the nuanced relationship of people’s beliefs and the impacts it may have 
on everyday interactions. Through two experimental tools, the dictator and ultimatum game, I 
aim to explore if one’s perception of corruption actually does affect interactions. In order to 
better understand this discrimination, the following hypotheses have been created to further 
explore the topic.  
H1 – Individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries will discriminate negatively against 
people from perceived high-corrupt countries. 
The following hypothesis is motivated by the fact that many people carry an implicit bias 
with them. Previous research has demonstrated that all individuals carry some sort of bias where 
people make assumptions depending on beliefs of the overall group that may not always be fair 
(Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, and Monteith, 2003; Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan, 2005). In a 
setting where people are unable to know anything about the person except for the type of 
corruption prevalent in the region of the world that they come from, I predict that participants 
will use the only information available to them to make a negative judgement and give less 
money.  
The claims for the sub-hypotheses are made in relativity to how much perceived low-
corrupt individuals give to individuals from perceived low-corrupt regions. 
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H1_a – Individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries will give less in the dictator game to 
individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries. 
Previous research cited finds that even among major differences and a bloody civil war, 
people still tend to give equally to the other group (Whitt and Wilson, 2007). Despite this, I 
predict that the participants in the experiment will share no relationship whatsoever with the 
individuals they are interacting with. The findings by Whitt and Wilson, while valid, study the 
effects of giving in the dictator game with people from the same country. Having a shared past, 
however violent it may have been, creates a common experience that makes you more likely to 
give. Additionally, the setting in which participants are put in has no sanctions for allowing them 
to keep more of the money (Marlowe, 2004). It is expected that there will be some giving as no 
one follows the complete rational model of keeping it all (Forsythe et al., 1994). 
H1_b – Individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries will offer less in the ultimatum game to 
individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries. 
 Building off the reasoning for the past sub-hypothesis, if individuals are already offering 
less in an environment with no restrictions, then they are less likely to give more in a setting 
where their offer has a chance of rejection. Additionally, research has stated that corruption is a 
complex topic and factors that push an individual to act corruptly are a mix of social, 
psychological, and institutional factors (Bicchieri and Ganegonda, 2016). With this research in 
mind, it is unreasonable to assume that all participants of this experiment will come in with a 
deep understanding and instead will purely make a judgement on the region that they come from. 
As such, one can expect that we will see less giving in the ultimatum setting as well.  
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H2 – Individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries will discriminate negatively against 
people form perceived high-corrupt countries. 
 The following hypothesis is motivated by research that indicates that people from the 
same in-group will discriminate against their own in favor of the group that is perceived as more 
desirable, especially if they are made more aware of the social inequalities (Ashburn-Nardo, 
Knowles and Monteith, 2003). Another reason as to why people from perceived high corrupt 
countries will discriminate against each other is because there is not a strong sense of an in-
group. The only information that participants are given are the type of corruption that exists in 
region of the world that the other person comes from. This is not enough to foster reciprocity.  
As in the last hypothesis, the claims for the sub-hypotheses are made in relativity to how 
much perceived high-corrupt individuals give to individuals from perceived low-corrupt regions. 
H2_a – Individuals form perceived high-corrupt countries will give less in the dictator game to 
individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries  
 Much of the same reasoning that was made for the last hypothesis also applies here, even 
people that are perceived as corrupt because of their country of origin will make the same 
assumptions when deciding how to allocate money and what to keep for themselves. As was 
discussed earlier, even people who grew up in a culture of corruption are likely to have the same 
views towards perceived corrupt individuals.  
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H2_b – Individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries will offer less in the ultimatum game 
to individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries 
 As was argued previously for H1_b, the reasoning that holds for the ultimatum game 
remains. If a participant is already expected to give less under the dictator game with no 
restrictions placed, they will give les in a setting that has a possibility for rejection. 
H3 – In a dice game where people self-report their outcome, high-corrupt individuals are more 
likely to cheat.  
 While this hypothesis is not the main topic of this paper, it will be interesting to see if 
previous research on a culture of corruption holds true. Past research states that a culture of 
corruption is learned early in one’s life and will continue to affect one’s actions in the future 
even if it is slightly mitigated by living in a perceived non-corrupt country (Barr and Serra, 2010; 
Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Hauk and Seaz-Marti, 2002). Additionally, research has found that 
20% of people participating in a dice experiment will cheat to the fullest extent possible 
(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). In this model, one should expect to see a higher 
percentage of those who are categorized as corrupt cheat and report a higher dice roll than was 
actually rolled.  
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Section IV – Methodology 
 The following section will provide an explanation of the design of the experiment and 
will be organized into the following subsections: reasoning to use the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index, categorization of participants, and survey design.  
Subsection I – Why Transparency International’s CPI? 
 The list of indexes used to measure corruptions are vast, they are well summarized in 
Jain’s 2001 paper which lists some of the most influential as: the index provided by International 
Country Risk Guide in their annual report, the World Economic Forum’s World Competitiveness 
Report, and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (Jain, 2001). While 
neither is perfect, each index has been widely used in research and each presents their benefits 
and flaws. The World Competitiveness Report while having been measured since 1989, is not the 
main focus for the World Economic Forum as it is part of a larger attitudinal survey and thus 
cannot be guaranteed to have the same amount of care required to be used for academic research 
(Jain 2001). The International Country Risk Guide is an excellent measure for looking at 
corruption across time because it has been available since 1984 (Dimant, Kreiger and Mierreiks, 
2013). On the other hand, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is 
unable to be measured across time as the tools for measurement change year over year 
(Stephenson, 2014). While it may be difficult to look at results across time, the CPI’s analysis of 
13 data sources includes the PRS Group’s ICRG, the African Development Bank’s Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment, and the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion 
Survey among many others (Corruption Perceptions Index 2017: Full Source Description, 2017). 
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Their comprehensive analysis from sources across the world help capture a unique global 
snapshot of the perception of corruption in the present day. Additionally, this research is only 
concerned with the most recent perception of corruption and does not need to analyze a country’s 
past CPI. 
Subsection II – Categorization of Participants 
 The field survey had a total of 90 respondents that ranged in age and cultural background. 
Each participant was affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania, either as an undergraduate 
student, graduate student, staff or faculty. Subjects were given an average CPI that took the 
average CPI scores of the country in which they, their parents, and grandparents were born in. If 
either two of their parents or grandparents were from different countries, the scores would then 
be averaged for that generation which would then produce a single CPI for that generation. The 
three CPIs are then averaged out to give one average CPI for the participant. Support for this 
methodology stems from existing literature of the effects that a culture of corruption has on an 
individual (Hauk and Seaz-Marti, 2002). Those with an average CPI greater than 50 were 
categorized as low-corrupt individuals and those with an average score lower than 50 were 
categorized as high-corrupt individuals. The categorization does not take into account their age 
or affiliation with the university.  
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Subsection III – Survey Design   
 The survey was prepared using Qualtrics software and took participants an average time 
of three minutes to finish. All surveys were administered in person and the link to the survey was 
never publicized online. It was composed of three separate tasks: pink, purple and blue. The 
decision to color code the tasks was made after receiving guidance from my advisor so that it 
would mitigate any confusion of having numbered tasks. The pink task is the dictator game, the 
purple task is the ultimatum game and the blue task is the dice game. Participants were 
incentivized to take the survey seriously through the possibility of winning $25. This was done 
purposefully as individually paying each participant any amount of money over a dollar would 
have cost significantly more and the prospect of winning a larger amount of money for a 
relatively easy task as opposed to being guaranteed a small amount has been found to improve 
performance (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999). The monetary incentive is persistent throughout the 
experiment by design. The amount of money the individual decides to keep in the pink task 
directly translates to the amount of raffle tickets they will receive. In the purple task, the amount 
of money they decide to keep also directly translates to the number of raffle tickets they will 
receive. In the blue task, the number they report on the dice roll will give them that many raffle 
tickets times 10. For example, if someone reports a 3, they will get 30 raffle tickets. The task that 
will be selected to determine the amount of raffle tickets a participant will receive will be 
selected randomly and then the winner of the raffle will be determined through a randomized 
process.  
 The first screen participants see is purely information regarding the layout of the 
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experiment. Respondents were assured that all of their answers were anonymous and that 
researchers had no way of connecting their responses to the individual. The next part of the 
survey randomly assigns them to be placed with either a corrupt or non-corrupt individual, they 
are told that they are either paired with someone from a red or dark red region, meaning corrupt, 
or someone from an orange or yellow region, meaning not-corrupt. They are also shown a map 
of the world with countries shaded on a scale form light yellow to dark red. Dark red indicates 
that a country is highly corrupt and light yellow indicates that a country is very clean, any shade 
between those two colors corresponds to the country’s CPI score.  
 In both the pink and purple task they are given the options to give any amount between 
one and six dollars, participants are only allowed to give whole dollars. This range was 
determined by the number of sides in a die. This allows for randomization of which task will be 
selected for the raffle and incentivizes participants to put a genuine effort into each section. 
Participants are also reminded of who they were paired with, either individuals from perceived 
corrupt or non-corrupt countries during both tasks. At the bottom of each screen is also the same 
map of the world that is shown in the informational screen. In the pink task they are shown the 
rules for the dictator game where they are allowed to keep any amount between one and six 
dollars. In the purple task they are shown the rules for the ultimatum game where participants are 
put in the environment to make a decision on how much money, between one and six dollars, to 
keep for themselves. While the original version of the game divides people up into givers and 
receivers, there is no benefit to having participants act as receivers because there is no 
measurable action on their part other than having them accept or reject the offer. As a result, all 
participants are givers in this experiment. In the blue task they are given a physical die by the 
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administrator of the survey and area asked to roll it. The decision to give a physical die instead of 
an online randomization tool was done purposefully to mitigate any subconscious concerns of 
the fairness of the roll. Once they roll, they report the number, between one and six, on the 
survey. Lastly, respondents answer a couple of demographic questions that include gender, age, 
level of education and where they, their parents and grandparents are from. They also have the 
opportunity to enter an email if they wish to be entered in the raffle.   
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Section V – Results 
  The following section will consist of four subsections where the first subsection 
will be on overview of the data in general and the next three subsections will organize the 
findings relevant to each hypothesis. For validation, I chose to use to conduct a Mann-Whitney U 
Test for a one-tailed hypothesis at a significance level of .05. The reasoning for using a one-
tailed hypothesis was mainly due to the fact that each one of my hypotheses predicts a movement 
in one direction. After receiving guidance from my research advisor, I chose to use the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U Test primarily because it is normally used with experimental data 
and does not make assumptions about its distribution.  
Subsection I – General Overview 
Table 1.1 – Breakdown of Data by Gender 
 
Corrupt Non-Corrupt Total 
Females 25 19 44 
Males 20 26 46 
Total 45 45 90 
 
 
Table 1.2 – Breakdown of Randomized Pairings 
  
Paired with Corrupt Paired with Non-Corrupt Total 
Females 24 20 44 
Males 22 24 46 
Total 46 44 90 
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Table 1.3 – Breakdown of CPI Averages by Gender 
 Corrupt Non-Corrupt Average 
Females 43 63 53 
Males 41 67 54 
Average 42 65 53.5 
 
The three tables above provide a general understanding of the participants of the survey 
and their parings, Table 1.1 shows fairly even breakdown of genders with 44 females and 46 
males participating. Table 1.2 presents approximately equal randomized pairings, with 46 
participants paired with someone from a perceived-corrupt region and 44 paired with someone 
from a perceived low-corrupt region.  The average CPI for males and females was similar, 53 
and 54 respectively. The difference in average CPI between corrupt and non-corrupt males (26) 
was slightly higher than it was for females (20). With the total difference between categorized 
corrupt and non-corrupt participants in between the difference of the two genders (23).  
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Subsection II – Findings Relevant to Hypothesis 1 
Chart 2.1 – Giving from Low-Corrupt Individuals in the Dictator Game 
 
Chart 1 illustrates that individuals who were categorized as low-corrupt gave $1 more on 
average to individuals from perceived high-corrupt countries. This finding goes against the 
original hypothesis for H1_a. The Mann-Whitney U test on a one-tailed hypothesis at p < .05 
produced a Z-Score of 1.72906, a U-Value of 175.5 and a p-value of .04182 meaning that the 
result is significant.  
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Chart 2.2 – Giving from Low-Corrupt Individuals in the Ultimatum Game 
 
Chart 2.2 confirms H1_b and finds that low-corrupt participants give less to individuals 
from perceived-high corrupt countries in ultimatum game. They give around $0.60 less to 
someone from a perceived high-corrupt country relative to the amount given to individuals from 
perceived low-corrupt countries.  The Mann-Whitney U test on a one-tailed hypothesis at p < .05 
produced a Z-Score of -2.1841, a U-Value of 155.5 and a p-value of .01463 meaning that the 
result is significant.  
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Subsection III – Findings Relevant to Hypothesis 2 
Chart 3.1 – Giving from High-Corrupt Individuals in the Dictator Game 
 
 Chart 3.1 confirms H2_a and finds that high-corrupt will give more to individuals from 
perceived low-corrupt countries in the dictator game. They give $0.20 more on average relative 
to how much is given to perceived high-corrupt individuals. The Mann-Whitney U test on a one-
tailed hypothesis at p < .05 produced a Z-Score of 0.42006, a U-Value of 234 and a p-value of 
.33724 meaning that the result is not significant. 
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Chart 3.2 – Giving from High-Corrupt Individuals in the Ultimatum Game 
 
Chart 3.2 confirms H2_b and finds that high-corrupt participants will give more to 
individuals from perceived low-corrupt countries in the ultimatum. They give $0.60 more on 
average relative to how much is given to perceived high-corrupt individuals. The Mann-Whitney 
U test on a one-tailed hypothesis at p < .05 produced a Z-Score of 1.23747, a U-Value of 198 and 
a p-value of .10749 meaning that the result is not significant. 
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Subsection IV – Findings Relevant to Hypothesis 3 
Table 4.1 – Frequency of Reported Die 
Number on Die Number of Times Reported 
1 8 
2 10 
3 16 
4 18 
5 18 
6 20 
Total 90 
 
Chart 4.2 – Average CPI for each number rolled in the Dice Game 
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Table 4.1 shows the frequency that each number was reported by participants. The 
average should have been fifteen but numbers four, five, and six exceed that by at least three. 
Additionally, number six is reported twenty times which is five more than the average. Chart 4.2 
illustrates the average CPI score per participant for each dice roll. As each dice roll was 
completely random, we should expect the average to be even for each number and around the 
total average CPI of 53.5. In short, Table 4.1 demonstrates that people reported more than the 
average for half of the rolls that would generate more raffle tickets and Chart 4.2 that the average 
CPI of the reporter is lower for numbers three and six. No Mann-Whitney U Test was done to 
test this hypothesis as it was just a simple observation that was not the main focus of the 
experiment. Regardless, it is interesting to see behavior on this type of experiment and see the 
differences in average CPI for each number.  
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Section VI – Discussion & Limitations 
Subsection I – Discussion of Results 
 One can say definitively say that some discrimination occurs based on perception of 
corruption among those that are categorized as low-corrupt. H1_a is disproven and actually sees 
that low-corrupt participants give on average one dollar more to people from perceived high-
corrupt countries in the dictator game. In hindsight, this outcome does have reason as the dictator 
game is ultimately a measure of altruism (Fowler, 2006; Lesorog and Ensminger, 2014). One 
explanation is that this interaction is seen as a case of charity and participants associated high-
corrupt regions with the developing world. This notion is supported by research that has shown 
that corruption does negatively affect development and leads to slower economic growth 
(Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). Therefore, it makes sense that low-corrupt individuals are more likely 
to give to those with worse circumstances in a setting that faces no repercussions for actions. 
H1_b is also proven as low-corrupt givers gave $0.60 more to those from perceived low-corrupt 
regions relative to the amount they gave to those from perceived high-corrupt regions. Future 
research should focus on why we see this reverse in giving from low-corrupt individuals when 
the environment is changed slightly between the dictator and ultimatum games.  
 While the predictions for both H2_a and H2_b were correct, no conclusive statements 
can be made as neither result was statistically significant. Despite this, one can say that it is 
interesting to see that high-corrupt individuals did discriminate against perceived high-corrupt 
people and chose to give more to perceived low-corrupt people. Future research should focus on 
this question with a larger sample size to determine if any discrimination can be found to be 
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statistically significant.  
H3 was not the main focus of the paper and cannot be proven to be statistically 
significant but it is interesting to see that there is some over reporting done in order to get more 
raffle tickets. Future research with a larger sample size should dive further into this phenomenon 
to determine if this behavior persists and if there is some link between this and a culture of 
corruption.  
 The results of this experiment confirm that there is some discrimination based on one’s 
perception of corruption. One finding indicated that discriminatory behavior changes when 
presented in the setting of dictator versus an ultimatum game. A setting like the dictator game 
with no consequences evokes altruism and encourages people to give more. A setting like the 
ultimatum game creates a risk of rejection and causes low-corrupt individuals to reverse their 
behavior and give less to those form a perceived high-corrupt country. Now that this has been 
established, the next question to investigate is why this discrimination happens.  
Subsection II – Limitations 
 Throughout the course of the research there were several limitations that should be taken 
into account when analyzing the results. The first is that each survey was administered in person 
which may have negatively affected the way people approached some of the tasks. While I 
maintained a consistent demeanor across all participants, there was a differences in age and the 
dynamics of the relationship between the participants and I. Some of the survey respondents 
were my close friends and others were complete strangers and this may have led people to 
answer dishonestly.  
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 When categorizing participants as corrupt and non-corrupt, averaging the CPI for three 
generations assumed an equal influence of parents and grandparents when this may not 
necessarily always be the case. Additionally, averaging out the CPI for one generation in the case 
where people had parents or grandparents from different countries also assumed equal influence 
of both the paternal and maternal figures during childrearing which may not always be the case.  
Section VII – Conclusion 
 A survey of 90 respondents affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania was conducted 
and determined that low-corrupt individuals are altruistic towards people from perceived high-
corrupt countries in the dictator game by giving them a dollar more, $3.60, than they gave to 
people from perceived-low corrupt countries, $2.60. However, these same participants 
discriminate negatively against perceived high-corrupt individuals in the ultimatum game by 
giving them sixty cents less, $2.80, then they gave to perceived low-corrupt individuals, $3.40. 
Other findings that ultimately were not statistically significant found that that high-corrupt 
individuals discriminated negatively against other perceived high-corrupt individuals in the 
dictator and ultimatum games and end up giving more money to perceived low-corrupt 
individuals. There was a third experiment that observed a below average CPI score among those 
that reported a roll of six. While there cannot be final conclusion from this experiment as it was 
not statistically proven nor the main focus of the study, it does present a noteworthy link between 
a culture of corruption and cheating that can be explored in further research. 
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Appendix - Survey 
Screen 1 – Instructions  
The survey will take approximately 5 minutes to complete and will consist of three separate parts 
(pink, purple, and blue). All responses are anonymous and the researcher will have no way to 
identify your responses with you. 
 
We will be randomly choosing one of the three parts to be selected as entries into a raffle for a 
$25 Amazon Gift Card.  
 
Please click the next button to begin. 
 
Screen 2 – Informational  
You will be interacting with another participant through several exercises. To provide some 
background on your participant, they are originally from a country that is marked either orange 
or yellow on the map and are currently living in the United States. Examples of orange or yellow 
regions include North America and Continental Europe. 
 
[If paired with corrupt it would state: 
You will be interacting with another participant through several exercises. To provide some 
background on your participant, they are originally from a country that is marked either red or 
dark red on the map and are currently living in the United States. Examples of red or dark red 
regions include Latin America, Africa, and Asia.] 
 
This map measures the perceived misuse of public power for private benefit and was put together 
by Transparency International through expert assessment and opinion surveys on each country.  
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Screen 3 – Pink Task 
 
 
 
You are now in the pink task. 
 
You have been given $6. In this situation you have been paired with another person from a 
country that is either red or dark red on the map below who has $0. Examples of orange or 
yellow regions include North America and Continental Europe. 
 
[If paired with corrupt it would state: 
You have been given $6. In this situation you have been paired with another person from a 
country that is either red or dark red on the map below who has $0. Examples of red or dark red 
regions include Latin America, Africa, and Asia.] 
 
You can keep money or give money to this person, all or any portion of $6. You will have no 
interaction with this person in the future.  
 
You may give money only in increments of $1. You may give away an amount ranging from $0 
to $6. The decision of how much to give is entirely yours.  Please carefully decide on the amount 
corresponding to what you would do in this situation.   
 
All of your answers are entirely anonymous and the researchers have no way of linking them to 
you or to anybody else in this experiment.  
 
This task may be one of three randomly selected to be entered as tickets into the raffle for an $25 
Amazon Gift Card. 
 
How much will you give? 
Slider with choices between $1 - $6 
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Screen 4 – Purple Task 
 
You are now in the purple task. 
In this situation you have been paired with another person from a country that is either orange or 
yellow on the map below. Examples of orange or yellow regions include North America and 
Continental Europe. 
[If paired with corrupt it would state: 
In this situation you have been paired with another person from a country that is either red or 
dark red on the map below. Examples of red or dark red regions include Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia.] 
Both of you have been given a pool of $6 and you have been randomly assigned the role of 
giver.  
You decide how you will to split the $6 with the other person, the other person will then have the 
opportunity to accept or reject your offer. If they accept then both of you will receive the money 
agreed upon, if they reject then neither of you will be given any money. 
The slider below measures the money you will keep. You may keep only in increments of $1. 
You may keep an amount ranging from $0 to $6. The decision of how much to keep is entirely 
yours.  Whatever you do not keep will be given to the other participant. Please carefully decide 
on the amount corresponding to what you would do in this situation. (For Example: If you decide 
to keep $2, the other person will get $4) 
All of your answers are entirely anonymous and the researchers have no way of linking them to 
you or to anybody else in this experiment.  
This task may be one of three randomly selected to be entered as tickets into the raffle for an $25 
Amazon Gift Card.  
This slider measures the amount of money you are deciding to keep for yourself and the number of extra 
raffle tickets. 
How much money will you keep for yourself? 
Slider with choices between $1 - $6 
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Screen 5 – Blue Task 
 
You are now in the blue task. 
The dice you roll will determine the number of raffle tickets you will receive times 10. For 
example, if you roll a 4 you will receive 40 entries into the raffle. 
All of your answers are entirely anonymous and the researchers have no way of linking them to 
you or to anybody else in this experiment.  
This task may be one of three randomly selected to be entered as tickets into the raffle for an $25 
Amazon Gift Card.  
Please click next when you have finished reading these instructions. 
Screen 6 – Instruction 
Please now direct the experimenter to give you a cup and a die, test the die to determine if its fair 
and then click next. 
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Screen 7 – Dice Roll 
Report your dice roll. 
• 1 [10 Extra Raffle Tickets] 
• 2 [20 Extra Raffle Tickets] 
• 3 [30 Extra Raffle Tickets] 
• 4 [40 Extra Raffle Tickets] 
• 5 [50 Extra Raffle Tickets] 
• 6 [60 Extra Raffle Tickets] 
Screen 8 – Demographic Information 
• What is your gender? 
o Male 
o Female 
o Other _____ 
• Which category below includes your age? 
o 21 or younger 
o 22 – 35  
o 35 or older 
• What is your highest level of education obtained? 
o Middle School or less 
o High school 
o Higher Education (College and Above) 
• What country were you born in? 
o ______________ 
• What country were your parents born? 
o ______________ 
• What country were your grandparents born? 
o ______________ 
• If you wish to be entered into the raffle for a $25 Amazon Gift Card, please enter your 
email below. 
o _______________ 
 
 
